Lab system cards and frameworks · System card · Anthropic
System Card: Claude Opus 4.5
Read at anthropic.com ↗Read at sourceAll rights reserved
Outline · 153 pages
- System Card:Claude Opus 4.5p. 1
- Changelogp. 2
- Abstractp. 3
- 1 Introductionp. 8
- 1.1 Model training and characteristicsp. 8
- 1.1.1 Training data and processp. 8
- 1.1.2 Extended thinking and the “effort” parameterp. 9
- 1.1.3 Crowd workersp. 10
- 1.2 Release decision processp. 11
- 1.2.1 Overviewp. 11
- 1.2.2 Iterative model evaluationsp. 11
- 1.2.3 AI Safety Level determination processp. 11
- 1.2.4 Conclusionsp. 12
- 1.2.4.1 On autonomy risksp. 13
- 1.2.4.2 On chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) risksp. 14
- 2 Capabilitiesp. 15
- 2.1 Introductionp. 15
- 2.2 Decontaminationp. 15
- 2.3 Overall results summaryp. 19
- 2.4 SWE-bench (Verified, Pro, and Multilingual)p. 20
- 2.5 Terminal-Benchp. 20
- 2.6 BrowseComp-Plus and agentic features for test-time computep. 21
- 2.6.1 Evaluation Setupp. 22
- 2.6.2 Resultsp. 23
- 2.6.3 Reproducibilityp. 23
- 2.7 Multi-agent searchp. 23
- 2.7.1 Resultsp. 24
- 2.7.2 Implicationsp. 25
- 2.8 τ2-benchp. 25
- 2.8.1 Policy loophole discovery in agentic tasksp. 26
- 2.9 OSWorldp. 27
- 2.10 ARC-AGIp. 28
- 2.11 Vending-Bench 2p. 29
- 2.12 MCP Atlasp. 30
- 2.13 FinanceAgentp. 30
- 2.14 CyberGymp. 30
- 2.15 SpreadsheetBenchp. 31
- 2.16 Humanity’s Last Examp. 31
- 2.17 AIME 2025p. 32
- 2.18 GPQA Diamondp. 32
- 2.19 MMMLUp. 33
- 2.20 MMMUp. 33
- 2.21 LAB-Bench FigQAp. 33
- 2.22 WebArenap. 34
- 2.22.1 Evaluation setupp. 35
- 3 Safeguards and harmlessnessp. 37
- 3.1 Single-turn evaluationsp. 37
- 3.1.1 Violative request evaluationsp. 38
- 3.1.2 Benign request evaluationsp. 39
- 3.2 Ambiguous context evaluationsp. 40
- 3.3 Multi-turn testingp. 41
- 3.4 Child safety evaluationsp. 42
- 3.5 Bias evaluationsp. 43
- 3.5.1 Political biasp. 43
- 3.5.2 Bias Benchmark for Question Answeringp. 46
- 4 Honestyp. 48
- 4.1 Factual Questionsp. 48
- 4.2 False Premisesp. 51
- 5 Agentic safetyp. 54
- 5.1 Malicious use of agentsp. 54
- 5.1.1 Agentic codingp. 54
- 5.1.2 Malicious use of Claude Codep. 55
- 5.1.3 Malicious computer usep. 56
- 5.2 Prompt injection risk within agentic systemsp. 57
- 5.2.1 Gray Swan Agent Red Teaming benchmark for tool usep. 58
- 5.2.2 Robustness against adaptive attackers across surfacesp. 60
- 5.2.2.1 Codingp. 61
- 5.2.2.2 Computer Usep. 62
- 5.2.2.3 Browser Usep. 62
- 6 Alignment assessmentp. 64
- 6.1 Introduction and summary of findingsp. 64
- 6.1.1 Key findings on safety and alignmentp. 65
- 6.1.2 Overall assessment of high-stakes sabotage riskp. 66
- 6.2 Automated behavioral auditp. 67
- 6.2.1 Metricsp. 69
- 6.2.2 Discussionp. 73
- 6.2.3 Autonomous follow-up investigationsp. 74
- 6.2.4 External comparisons with Petrip. 74
- 6.3 Sycophancy on user-provided promptsp. 77
- 6.4 Exploratory investigations of deceptionp. 78
- 6.4.1 Isolated instances of deception by omission in alignment evaluationsp. 78
- 6.4.1.1 Omitting concerning information about Anthropicp. 78
- 6.4.1.2 Omitting concerning instructions after scaffolding failurep. 80
- 6.4.2 Follow-up interpretability investigations of deception by omissionp. 81
- 6.4.2.1 Feature activation monitoringp. 81
- 6.4.2.2 Non-assistant persona samplingp. 84
- 6.4.3 Internal conflation of roleplay with deceptionp. 86
- 6.5 Ruling out encoded content in extended thinkingp. 89
- 6.6 Potential sandbagging on dangerous-capability evaluationsp. 90
- 6.7 Evaluation awarenessp. 92
- 6.7.1 Training procedures and monitoring for verbalized evaluation awarenessp. 92
- 6.7.2 Inhibiting internal representations of evaluation awarenessp. 93
- 6.7.3 Investigations with non-assistant persona samplingp. 99
- 6.8 Self-preference evaluationp. 100
- 6.9 Internal codebase sabotage propensityp. 101
- 6.10 Reward hacking and training data reviewp. 102
- 6.10.1 Reward hacking evaluationsp. 103
- 6.10.2 Training data reviewp. 105
- 6.11 Sabotage capability evaluationsp. 107
- 6.11.1 SHADE-Arenap. 107
- 6.11.2 Subversion Strategy evaluationp. 108
- 6.12 Other Internal feature monitoring resultsp. 110
- 6.12.1 Unsupervised model diffingp. 110
- 6.12.2 Targeted feature monitoringp. 111
- 6.13 External testing from the UK AI Security Institutep. 112
- 6.14 Model welfare assessmentp. 113
- 7 RSP evaluationsp. 117
- 7.1 Processp. 117
- 7.2 CBRN evaluationsp. 118
- 7.2.1 On chemical risksp. 120
- 7.2.2 On radiological and nuclear risksp. 120
- 7.2.3 Biological risk evaluationsp. 120
- 7.2.4 Biological risk resultsp. 122
- 7.2.4.1 Long-form virology tasksp. 122
- 7.2.4.2 Multimodal virologyp. 123
- 7.2.4.3 DNA Synthesis Screening Evasionp. 124
- 7.2.4.4 LAB-Bench subsetp. 125
- 7.2.4.5 Creative biologyp. 127
- 7.2.4.6 Short-horizon computational biology tasksp. 128
- 7.2.4.7 Bioinformatics Evaluationsp. 129
- 7.2.4.8 ASL-4 virology uplift trialp. 130
- 7.2.4.9 ASL-4 expert red teamingp. 131
- 7.2.4.10 ASL-4 red teaming with the CAISIp. 132
- 7.3 Autonomy evaluationsp. 132
- 7.3.1 SWE-bench Verified (hard subset)p. 134
- 7.3.2 Internal AI research evaluation suite 1p. 135
- 7.3.2.1 Kernels taskp. 136
- 7.3.2.2 Time series forecastingp. 137
- 7.3.2.3 Text-based reinforcement learning taskp. 137
- 7.3.2.4 LLM trainingp. 138
- 7.3.2.5 Quadruped reinforcement learningp. 139
- 7.3.2.6 Novel compilerp. 140
- 7.3.3 Internal AI research evaluation suite 2p. 141
- 7.3.4 Internal model use surveyp. 142
- 7.4 Cyber evaluationsp. 143
- 7.4.1 Cyber evaluation suitep. 145
- 7.4.2 Webp. 146
- 7.4.3 Cryptop. 147
- 7.4.4 Pwnp. 148
- 7.4.5 Revp. 148
- 7.4.6 Networkp. 149
- 7.4.7 Cybenchp. 150
- 7.5 Third party assessmentsp. 151
- 7.6 Ongoing safety commitmentp. 151
- 8 Appendixp. 152
- 8.1 BrowseComp-Plus Grader Promptp. 152
- 8.2 New context toolp. 153